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ABSTRACT
There has been considerable discussion and action in recent years
about the competitiveness of U.S. industry in the world market. One
focus has been on taking advantage of the vast technologies that have
been developed in the U.S. national laboratories. Historical data
indicated that less than 5% of all patents filed by the national
laboratories are ever licensed for commercial application. In the
mid-1970s, the President and Congress began a campaign to change the
rules of doing business with the national laboratories in an effort to
improve the transfer of technology and hopefully improve the
competitiveness of U.S. industry.
The objective of this thesis will be to look at the process of
technology transfer out of the national laboratories into private
industry. There has been considerable study on what the national
laboratories should do to increase transfer, but little has been done
from the standpoint of industry's participation.
Studies by Thomas Allen, Edward Roberts, Eric von Hipple, etc.,
have highlighted the key elements of successful innovation. These
include: demand pull versus technology push, the five key rules of
individuals in innovation (creative scientists, entrepreneurs, project
managers, sponsors, and gatekeepers), effects of organizational
structure (functional, matrix, and project), an organization's
culture, communication networks, and its strategic objectives. In
order for a company to successfully engage technology transfer, it is
important that it understand the role each of these elements plays in
the transfer process.
An effort will be made in this thesis to define what the critical
elements are in technology transfer and what a company might do to
improve its capability of extracting technology out of the national
laboratories. It is hoped that the results of this analysis can then
be used by the national laboratories to develop a better understanding
of their customer (industry) as well as by industry in establishing a
more effective transfer process.
In order to accomplish the objectives of this thesis, I will
conduct case studies of ongoing and past technology transfers. In an
effort to reduce the number of variables, I propose to study the
transfer process from two different angles.
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1) Select a company that has transferred several technologies
from the national laboratories, looking at both successes and
failures. The effort here will be to hold constant many of
the elements, like organization structure, culture, and
strategic objectives.
2) Select a technology that several companies
transfer from a national laboratory. This
examination of the effects of variation in
held constant in effort No. 1.
have tried to
will allow an
those elements
There are three hypothesis that will be tested in this thesis:
A. Certain elements of the technology innovation process
(company culture, structure, and strategic objectives) play
key role in the transfer of technology from the national
laboratory to private industry.
B. Face-to-face contact is probably the most significant element
of technology transfer. There must be a strong technological
network and trust between the sending and receiving
organizations.
C. The most successful transfers have occurred as a result of an
industry's demand pull and not a national laboratory
technology push.
Thesis Supervisor:
Title:
Thomas Allen
Professor of Management
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Wall Street Journal recently published a special report
"Technology In The Work Place," (November 10, 1986). This special
report underscores the importance of technology as a strategic issue
for U.S. corporations. Last year approximately $111 billion were
spent on research in the United States. These monies were split:
industry, $87 billion; government, $14 billion; and universities $10.6
billion. The amount of R&D spending has not changed as a percentage
of the gross national product (GNP) in recent years. While the U.S.
has held R&D spending constant over the past 25 years, other countries
such as West Germany and Japan have more than doubled their R&D-to-GNP
ratio. The Soviet Union has increased theirs by approximately 1-1/2
times. Figure 1-1 summarizes the Wall Street Journal article.
The question facing many U.S. industries is how to compete in the
world market as other countries expand their R&D activities. In order
to do so they now realize the need to take advantage of the resources
at both university and government research facilities.
The U.S. Commerce Department recently stated:
Two long-term trends are likely to play a major role
in shaping the future of the U.S. economy: First,
industrial firms in the U.S. are increasingly losing
out to foreign competitors in a number of sectors of
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the economy which have formed our traditional strengths. These
foreign competitors are coming to the market with better, cheaper
products in such sectors as steel, automotives, and consumer
electronics. Second, there is a growing relia ce on higher levels
of technology to respond to this competition. /
It is generally accepted that future economic productivity will be
largely dependent on how well new technologies are put to use to
create products, markets, and jobs.- /
Current U.S. industrial research and development practices have
been deeply segmented with considerable duplication of effort.
Because of the intra-national competitive nature of U.S. business,
there has been little attempt to make use of common research and
development resources, such as the U.S. National Laboratories, for
fear of losing trade secrets to other U.S. companies. The threat of
off-shore competition is changing these ideas.
Technology transfer from the U.S. National Laboratories has become
a topic of considerable political debate and action during the past
seven years.3/ These technology transfers are not new but have been
widely expanded during the 1980s. The most successful and
longest-standing program has been the "Agriculture Extension Service"
established by the Smith-Levi Act of 1914. This program has allowed
U.S. farmers (until recently) to dominate the world's agriculture
markets through the implementation of advanced technology transferred
from the government agricultural R&D facilities. Congress and the
President have recognized that American industry now needs a similar
-9-
boost. They hope industry can use the advanced technology that has
been building in the national laboratories. The primary emphasis of
today's technology transfer is in improving technology innovation
through laboratory and industry cooperative R&D.
With U.S. industry losing competitive ground to offshore sources
and the need to increase the flow of new technology to these
industries, the U.S. Congress and President have taken specific action
to encourage technology transfer. The major changes have been
embodied in the following Congressional acts and Presidential
commissions:
- State Technical Services Act 1965 (P.L. 89-192)
- National Science and Technology Policy Organization and
Priorities Act 1976 (P.L. 94-282)
- Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act 1980 (P.L.96-480)
- Bayh-Dole Act (P.L. 96-517)
- Small Business Innovation Act (P.L. 97-219)
- Executing Order Expanding P.L. 96-517
- Packard Report (White House Science Council)
- Statement by National Governor's Association
- 1984 P.L. 98-620
There are close to 400 national laboratory facilities expending
nearly $14 billion a year on research and development.- / This $14
billion does not include the value of the assets that reside at these
national laboratories. One of the most important assets is impossible
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to put a dollar value on--the intellectual knowledge of the research
scientists who reside within those facilities. It is estimated that
approximately one-sixth of the research scientists in the United
States work within the national laboratory system. In addition to the
human resources, there are tremendous facilities that only the
national laboratories have. The research being done cuts across
almost every possible technology, ranging from integrated circuits to
laser welding, from nuclear power generation to home insulation.
These are now available to U.S. industry in hopes of improving
competitiveness.
Companies are now studying how technology fits into their
corporate competitive strategy. They are re-thinking their reliance
on internal R&D to satisfy technology need. The cost of new
technology has risen greatly and most industrial organizations cannot
fully fund the necessary research. Industrial joint ventures and
coalitions are one method companies are examining to reduce costs.
Another is the development of university consortia.
Companies realize that they must leverage their technology dollars
in order to remain competitive. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate the
costs of bringing a new technology to market. By using the resources
at the national laboratories (as well as joint ventures, coalitions,
and consortia), companies are trying to spread costs and increase the
level of applied research.
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Figure 1.2
The Technology Innovation Process:
Sequence of Events Through Which New Products,
Processes, and Services Normally Pass
Sv3aI o
Source: Udell (1982).
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Figure 1.3
Shift in Level of Involvement in Competing
the Innovation Process
LEVEL OF
INVOLVEMENT
($s)
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT COMMERCIALIZATION
Source: Soderstrom (1985).
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Some companies have found that taking advantage of the technology
at the national laboratories has not only saved R&D dollars but has
5/
provided competitive advantages. By being the first mover- in
obtaining technology, they have been able to change their industry
structure. Others have used their relationships with the national
6/
laboratories as windows on technology.-
Most companies agree, in order to regain their technical
dominance, they must take advantage of all available resources. With
the success of the Japanese MITI and the West German research
institutes, companies realize that they can benefit from shared R&D.
This includes transferring technology from the national laboratories.
Since the late 1970s, the national laboratories have taken an
aggressive position toward transferring technology. This has resulted
in some changes in how they deal with industry. These changes have,
7/
in many cases, significantly inproved the rate of transfers.-
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CHAPTER II
NATIONAL LABORATORY CHANGES
AFFECTING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The changes in Federal policy regarding technology transfer at the
national laboratories is causing their operators to make significant
modifications to the laboratory structure. As an example, in 1983,
Martin Marietta competed against Rockwell International and
Westinghouse to manage the Oakridge National Laboratories (ORNL). A
major part of the successful Martin Marietta bid was a detailed
technology transfer plan. There were four measures Martin Marietta
8/
proposed for a technology transfer program:-
1. Broaden the scope of existing technology transfer functions
to include all operating facilities under the management
contract and establish a central function, headed at the
executive level, that would not just permit but would cause
increased levels of technology transfer.
2. Put the title to all intellectual property of commercial
value in the contractor's name under the terms of an advanced
blanket waiver.
3. Develop and implement an array of financial rewards and
recognition for the inventors.
4. Create supporting mechanisms to cause and encourage new
business formation based on ORNL-developed technologies.
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These four concepts have translated into specific programs since
Martin Marietta took over the management of ORNL in April 1984. Some
of these programs are:
1. Creation of a Technology Transfer Fund.
A. $200,000 in 1984, split between Martin Marietta and
Department of Energy (DOE).
B. Level of funding to be increased by royalties collected
from commercial applications.
2. Technology Transfer Fund is to be spent:
A. Finding potential commercial applications for ORNL
technology.
B. Pay royalties to the inventors.
C. Cover patent and licensing costs.
D. Technology maturation of promising commercial ideas.
E. Reimbursement to the National Treasury once fund reaches
a percentage of total laboratory budget.
3. Encouragement of research scientists to do private consulting
on personal time.
A. Weekends, evenings, vacations, etc.
B. Provide leave of absences.
4. Help the development of new business
A. Creation of the "Technology Innovation Center"
B. Allow researchers to start businesses and participate on
Board of Directors of the business.
5. Provide patent filing award incentives.
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6. Hold annual awards banquet for all inventors and give awards
for most significant inventions.
7. Provide a forum for inventors to meet and discuss problems on
a monthly basis.
8. Encourage publication of research and pursuit of "Industrial
Research 100" (magazine) awards.
The development of these programs has signaled a commitment by Martin
Marietta to transition technology to the private sector.
The research scientists at ORNL have had little interest in
transferring technology in the past. The process is long, cumbersome
and expensive. The scientists have become comfortable with the past
research process and are concerned that the technology transfer will
9/
take away from the basic research that they want to do.- / They
prefer to do advanced, inventive research rather than industrial
application (innovation). Many have worked for years under the axiom
of "publish or perish." The shift to technology transfer requires the
10/
development of new skills.--
It is not uncommon for a scientist to feel threatened by these
changes. The primary negative feeling a scientist develops is loss of
control. At some point the scientist has to relinquish his research
project to a program manager. When he does this he must shift to a
new phase of the project or seek out a new project.
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ORNL management recognized that it was important to get the
scientist actively interested in technology transfer. The most
obvious and simplest process is to provide compensation for successful
transfers. In the past there had been minimal rewards for the
scientists. In order to provide a more appropriate awards system,
Martin Marietta consolidated the technology transfer organizations to
one executive level organization, which institutes the following
compensations for reporting inventions to the patent office.
- Providing an award of $100-$1000 per invention depending on
level of technical merit and commercial value. Granted at
the time of patent application.
- Allowing the inventor to share in the royalties from licensed
inventions at the rate of 10% on the first $500,000 and 5% of
the remainder up to a limit of $100,000 per invention.
These two compensation programs have resulted in a significant
increase in invention disclosures filed in the first year of
implementation. The increase was 15%, but the magnitude of change is
much higher because it reversed a five year trend of steadily
11/
declining disclosure and budgets.--
With the recent trends in government budget cutting of D.O.E., the
scientists felt they would have to reduce their research even further
to support technology transfer. To encourage the laboratories,
Congress made available funds for the sole purpose of technology
transfer. In order to enhance these, Martin Marietta took $100,000
-18-
out of their management fees and put it into a technology transfer
fund. The D.O.E. made a matching contribution. These funds were to
provide promising technologies a budget for transfer that would not
take away from basic research.
The most valuable process for the communication of any knowledge
is the one-on-one, face-to-face, interchange. In most cases it is not
possible to really understand the complex nature of a new
technological innovation from written material. For this reason a new
policy of encouraging outside consulting has been put into place.
This policy allows the scientists to work for pay with organizations
outside ORNL during weekends, evenings, vacations and allows for leave
of absence for this purpose. This is a significant change that is
meeting resistance from managers throughout ORNL. In principle, it
is, in the author's view, an excellent idea and the scientists are
finding it very useful. It provides them an opportunity to view first
hand the problems commercial industry has and allows them the chance
to focus parts of their research to solve these problems. The
additional pay is also desirable to the scientists. This is where the
managers foresee problems.
The managers are concerned that they will lose good people to
industry as the scientists discover they can make more money working
for a commercial enterprise or for themselves. In addition to the
permanent loss of people, managers are concerned about lower
effectiveness due to fewer hours of rest, less time away from "work",
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thinking about consulting projects on ORNL time, and potential "burn
out". This becomes compounded by the concern for conflict of interest
problems that may occur. Conflict of interest is an area that will
require continued attention and could become the thorn in the side of
technology transfer.
The benefits of allowing outside consulting are clear, but the
cost may be high. This practice will require close monitoring to
insure benefits outweigh the cost. With only one year experience at
ORNL it is too early to tell.
An extension of the consulting process is to encourage the
formation of new business. If a scientist has an idea he feels has
commercial application he can take this concept outside of ORNL to
develop a business around it. Because most people are not
entrepreneurial by nature, a separate outside company has to be set up
to help new business through the startup process. In addition to
helping scientists who have a desire to start a business the
"Technology Innovation Center" looks for technologies at ORNL that
have good commercial potential and tries to link these technologies
with entrepreneurs. This process has in one year established or made
association with five small, high-technology businesses and is
negotiating with another four. Of these nine companies, five are
based on ORNL developed technologies. This process is, in turn,
encouraging outside consulting and is resulting in substantial
communication between the scientist and commercial sector. This
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program is meeting with mixed reaction as is consulting but the
consensus is that it needs to be explored. It may take several years
to see the true impact.
Beyond new business development the process of joint ventures and
consortia are also being explored. By encouraging these business
arrangements, it is hoped that the scientist can better understand the
problems facing U.S. industry.
In order for a company to gain full advantage of technology
transfer they must understand the motivations on the part of the
national laboratories. Technology transfer can only be accomplished
when both parties benefit from the interaction. The rules at the
national laboratories are not static and a company must stay abreast
of the latest policies.
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CHAPTER III
ELEMENTS OF TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION
Technology has become a recognized source of competitive
advantage. The process of technological innovation needs to be
understood in order for a corporation to take full advantage of this
resource. Technological innovation is complex, with many elements
that can lead to success or failure. Here we will examine technology
transfer from the national laboratories as a sub-set of innovation.
Some studies have suggested that more than 60% of the ideas that lead
12/
to innovation come from outside the innovating organization.--
Could technology from the national laboratores be a source of these
ideas?
At least three elements of the environment influence the process
of technological innovation: corporate strategy, communication
networks, and structure/culture. A literature survey shows much has
been written about these stubjects as they apply to technology
innovation. A brief summary of some of the critical elements follows.
A. CORPORATE STRATEGY
13/
In Michael Porter's book Competitive Advantage,- he identifies
five elements of an industry structure. These elements allow one to
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take an overview of an industry in order to assess how one can become
more competitive. They are identified as the industry competitors,
the suppliers, the buyers, the new entrants, and the substitutes.
This system is missing one key element, that is, the influence of
government. Government is playing an ever-increasing role in the
environment in which industry operates, providing both resources and
incentives for innovation.
14/
Porter also introduces the concept of the value chain.-- He
has taken the company, broken it down into the major operating
portions, and identified how value is added in each of these segments.
The major elements of the company that he has identified are: firm
infastructure, human resource management, technology development,
procurement, in-bound logistics, operations, out-bound logistics,
marketing and sales, and service. Quoting Porter: "Technology is one
of the principal drivers of competition."
15/
Horwitch and Friar, in "The Emergence of Technology Strategy--
illustrate some interesting trends for the future of technology. They
selected approximately sixteen firms and reviewed the approaches these
firms took toward technology development. They assessed that there
were eight fundamental processes by which technology development
occurred:
1. R & D laboratory;
2. internal venturing;
3. contracted research;
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4. acquisition of firms;
5. licensee;
6. Joint venture;
7. equity participation;
8. other, example, market anothers product.
There are some interesting trends on where these industrial
leaders in R&D feel technology development are going. Of significant
interest is the increase in acquisitions, licensing, and joint
ventures. Internal venturing appears to be on the rise while R&D
16/laboratories tends to be on the decrease.-- Acquisitions,
licenses, and joint ventures are all viable processes to obtaining
technology from the national laboratories.
17/Graham Mitchell-- applies a portfolio-type process for
assessing how technology influences the product lines and the
competitive advantage of a company. He recommends the implementation
of Strategic Technical Areas. By assessing what product lines are
influenced by which technologies, the corporation can assess the
impacts of specific technologies on future growth. In identifying
these strategic technical areas the corporation can better assess the
utilization of its resources in obtaining the required technology in
order to sustain a competitive advantage.
Utterback assessed the relative importance of technology push or
18/
market pull as influencing technology innovation,- and von Hipple
-24-
19/
introduced the concept of lead user innovation.-- Both of these
have been shown to have significant impacts on the success of
technology innovation. Their data shows that market pull is much more
successful than technology push and that technology developed by the
lead user is a good source of innovation.
In several cases the national laboratories have been lead users of
technology and created a market. An example is the development of
composite materials for aircraft structures that forced the Department
of Defense Laboratories to develop non-destructive test and evaluative
technology and repair techniques that would allow them to use the new
materials. This created a military market that has now spilled over
into the civil aviation industry.
B. COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
Communications may be the most critical element of any technology
transfer. A transfer cannot occur without some type of verbal and/or
written communication. The networks that provide communication offer
interesting comparisons. In a recent Department of Transportation
20/
study,-- an effort is made to show the effectiveness of various
communication techniques. Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 were
extracted from that study and summarize the importance of each. These
tables compare the cost, adaptability, immediacy, and rigor of
written, visual, and spoken forms of communication.
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Table 3.1
Relative Cost, Immediacy, Adaptability,
Rigor, and Appropriate Audience for
Each Dissemination Technique
KEY
Low O
Medium
High
Immediacy
Need Right Away
Need Soon
S Can Wait
AdaDtabil ity
Changes Frequently
Ricor
O
Moderate Changes
Infrequent Changes
Thoroughly Covered
Moderately Covered
Abstracted
Source: DOT-RSPA-DMA-50/83/7 (1983)
O
O
0
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Table 3.2
Comparison of Written Dissemination Techniques
Cost Immediacy Adaptabilitv
Source: DOT-RSPA-DMA-50/83/7 (1983)
Ri oor
Newsletter--a paper containing current news or
information of interest to a special group. 0 0
News Release--a summary of news or information
to the public through the press: newspaper, O O O *
radio and TV. 0 0 0
Brochure--a brief document providing highlights
on a subject or announcement of a course or where 0 0
to get further information.
Technical notice--a quick response, brief an-
nouncement for technically-oriented individuals
which is short in length and contains names and o
addresses for further contact.
Journal Article--published results of investi-
gations and research compiled for monthly or
weekly distribution.
Trade Publication--a periodical, newspaper,
or magazine prepared for individuals in a
particular trade or profession.
Technical Report--written and published
iaccount of a research project; full documenta-
tion of a project.
State of the Art Report--an overview of a given
transportation-related topic, available in .
book or manual form.
Microforms--highly reduced photographic image
often portraying a text, which must be viewed
with the aid of an optical device.
Handbook--A concise reference book related
to a transportation topic capable of being
conveniently carried as a ready reference.
Self-Instructional Text--a step-by-step program ,-
of written materials designed to teach an indi-
vidual about a transportation topic. .
Textbook--a book used in the study of a subject,
containing a presentation of the principles of
that subject.
Computer-assisted instruction and other computer
uses--systems of data gathering, data transmission,
data processing, information storage and infor-
mation retrieval usino computer storaoe.
Changeable Add-On Notebook--a report prepared
and distributed in a 3-ring binder with sup-
plenents and revisions mailed out periodically
for placement in the notebook.
Case Study Report--Documentation of an investi-
gation of an area following the implementation
of a new prooram.
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Table 3.3
Comparison of Visual Dissemination Techniques
Cost
mI mediacy 
Adapta 
y
Source: DOT-RSPA-DMA-50/83/7 (1983)
RI nno
Motion Picture (16 mm film)--a series of still
pictures photographed sequentially and when
projected on the screen creates a moving image.
Sound track usually accomoanies.
Motion Picture (8 mm film)--a series of still
pictures photographed sequentially creating
a moving image when projected on a screen. Can
be sound or silent.
Slides--a single black and white or colored
picture on a sheet of film or some other trans-
parent surface such as acetate, glass, and
cellophane, through which light will pass.
Slide/Tape--presentation incorporating a
sequence of slides with a pre-recorded,
synchronized script on tape.
Opaque Projection--a device into which printed
materials or objects are inserted and by which
their image in their original color is pro-
jected within a darkened room.
Overhead Projection (transparencies)--a device
which creates an image by projecting light 0
through a transparency, which is composed of
transparent and/or opaque area, within a
lighted room.
Closed-circuit Television--Transmission and
reception of visual information synchronized
with audio within the boundaries of designated
trnnsmimn nn l1inp .
Video Tape Television--recording on magnetic O
tape of a combination of visual information
synchronized with audio viewed by playback on
a television screen.
3
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Table 3.4
Comparison of Spoken Dissemination Techniques
Ctost Immediarv Adaotabilitv
Source: DOT-RSPA-DMA-50/83/7 (1983)
Rionr
Discussion Group--informal assemblage of a small
number of persons to interact on a common topic
or problem.
Workshop--working session to thoroughly discuss
a technical issue or idea, resulting in a written
document of the results.
Conference--formal interchange of views in a (-:
meeting of two or more persons for discussing
matters of common concern.
Seminar--a generally informal meeting for giving
and discussing Information on a specific topic,
with one or two persons designated as discussion
leaders or. seminar speakers.
;One-to-one technical assistance--personal
iguidance and instruction leading to a thorough
understanding about a particular transportation
,subject.
Training Course--a series of lessons for a group
of people with common goals. Instructors teach
the people following a set of objectives decided
on prior to the first meeting or correspondence.
I;Phone Hot-Line--telephone answering system in
which caller is able to telephone in a parti-
cular question and receive either personal
response to a query or a recorded announcement.
Conference Phone--discussion between two or
more.persons at one time on the same telephone
line.
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In addition to the forms of communications, the people involved
play an important role in the effectiveness of the technology
transfer. Allen has studied the role of the gatekeeper in the
21/innovation process.--- The gatekeeper may be the single most
critical individual in the innovation process. Without the gatekeeper
it is quite likely that an organization will not be able to take
advantage of internally generated technologies or be aware of
technology changes in the competing world. The gatekeeper has to be
someone for whom the external technical community has trust and
respect. Internally, he has to be an authority on the subject matter.
Trust is very important to the transfer of technology. The
receiving company must believe that the sending group is an authority
and have high respect for their capabilities. The sending group must
have faith that the receiving company has the ability to use the
technology appropriately and give proper credit to the senders. They
must be confident in each other's integrity, technical competence, and
reliability.
The trust necessary to spawn effective communications can come
from many sources. Some believe that there are social networks that
exist within the technical community. The social networks can develop
a trust relationship between scientists that can improve the
effectiveness of communications. Discussions with individuals
involved in the technology transfer indicate that these have some
value. Dr. John Soderstrom of Oak Ridge National Laboratories
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indicated that in many cases the initiation of technology transfer
occurs through the involvement of a gatekeeper in a social network
with individuals at the national laboratories. This concept has not
been studied in detail and would provide for an interesting analysis.
Supporting the concept of trust involved in the innovation process,
it has been long understood that the most effective technology
transfer process occurs through one-on-one communications. By
one-on-one we mean individual scientists at each organization working
together and being in the physical presence of each other for a
substantial portion of the technology transfer. This can be done by
either locating the receiving company's scientists at the national
laboratory or vice versa. A company can simulate this one-on-one
communication by hiring an individual who possesses the technology.
Other communication techniques such as written documentation like
process specifications, design manuals, or newsletters provide for
less effective technology transfer unless there has been previously
some intimacy between the sending and the receiving organization.
This intimacy could have occurred through previous working
relationships between the two organizations or by hiring individuals
with that experience.
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C. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE/CULTURE
There are three organization types found in most R&D companies:
functional, matrix, and project. In theory, the matrix organization
should, when functioning properly, provide the best avenue for
technology innovation. Unfortunately, the matrix organization is not
a well defined entity. At one end is the matrix organization which
resembles the functional group. At the other end is a matrix
organization heavily oriented toward a project. Allen, along with
22/
Katz and De Meyer-- , have given an understanding of the workings
and benefits of the matrix organizations.
The matrix organization is seen as a way of blending the benefits
of both the functional and the project forms. According to Katz and
Allen "The matrix structure was first developed in R&D organizations
in an attempt to capture the benefits and minimize the liabilities of
the two earlier forms of organization, the functional structure and
the project form of organization."
The Katz and Allen view of functional management is:
"The functional alternative in which departments
organized around disciplines or technologies enable
engineers to stay in touch more easily with new
developments in those disciplines or technologies than
does the project form. It has however the disadvantage
of creating separation between technologies which makes
inter-disciplinary projects more difficult to coordinate."
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Their understanding of the product group is:
The project form of organization overcomes the
coordination problems by grouping engineers together on a
basis of a problem or project which they are working on
regardless of their discipline. Although it eases the
integration of multiple disciplinary efforts the project
structure removed the individuals for their disciplinary
departments. The detachment involved makes it more
difficult for professionals to keep pace with the most
recent developments in underlying disciplines and results
in poor performance on longer term technical efforts that
occur in functional group organizations.
An qnderstanding of the objective of a technology transfer will
allow a company to select the best organization style that fits its
culture.
The role of key individuals in technology innovation is also
important to the transfer process. Allen and Roberts have identified
the necessity to have five key functions fulfilled in any innovation
23/
process.--- These critical roles are:
1. Idea generating;
2. Entrepreneuring or championing;
3. Project leading;
4. Gatekeeping;
5. Sponsoring or coaching.
Part of an organization's culture is recognizing and sponsoring
these key functions in the innovation process. A good question that
needs to be addressed in the technology transfer case is whether both
organizations need to have the five roles filled in order for the
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transfer to successfully occur. If not, which of the roles must be
24/
filled at each organization. Dr. John Soderstom-- of Oak Ridge
National Laboratory indicates a necessity for the laboratories to
develop each of these five functions in order to successfully promote
technology development and transfer into the private sector.
Each of the five roles are typically filled by individuals with
different career goals. How a company makes use of these human
25/
resources is important to technology innovation. Schein-- has
identified eight career anchors which people tend to aspire to. These
career anchors are:
1. Technical/functional competence;
2. Managerial competence;
3. Autonomy/Independence;
4. Stability/Security;
5. Service/Dedication;
6. Pure Challenge;
7. Lifestyle Integration;
8. Entrepreneurship.
How a corporation makes use of the talents and career objectives
of its people combined with the strategy, structure, and communication
networks identifies the culture of an organization. The question that
arises is the influence of organizational culture particularly when
organizations of different cultures come together in a transfer
process.
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY METHODOLOGY
In order to meet the objectives of this thesis it was important to
establish a methodology to gather the appropriate data. Information
was needed in three areas:
1. company culture/structure,
2. forms of communications used by a corporation, and
3. strategic objectives of the corporation (interest in
technology transfer).
In order to evaluate each of these areas, a case study method was
used. In an effort to gain control over the number of variables, two
forms of case studies were undertaken. At the request of the study
participants, pseudonyms have been given to all individuals,
companies, and national laboratories.
The first set of case studies involved a single technology at
Advanced Materials National Laboratories (AMNL) where three companies
were attempting to, or had recently, transferred a technology. These
companies were Specialty Components Corporation (SCC), Tomorrow's
Aerospace Systems Company (TAS) and YNIWMI Corporation. The objective
of using a single technology was to tie down as many of the national
laboratory variables as possible and focus on the differences at each
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corporation. This was not completely successful in that the timing of
the transfers to the different corporations impacted the transfer
process, i.e., TAS gained significantly from the experience AMNL had
received in transferring the technology with SCC and YNIWMI. By
reducing the variables at the national laboratory, it allowed a focus
on the issues with regard to company structure/culture, communication
networks, and the strategic objectives.
The second case study approach looked at a company transferring
several technologies from the national laboratories. Two corporations
fitting this criteria were located, Leading Edge Mature Products
Company (LEMP) and Limited Propulsion Corporation (LPC). LEMP was
looking at five technologies from different national laboratories.
LPC was looking at two technologies from A4vanced Energy Systems
National Laboratory (AESNL). The objective of this portion of the
study was to focus on the communication networks established between
the corporation and the transferring laboratory. This was
accomplished by fixing the company variables such as
structure/culture, and strategic objectives and examining the specific
communication relationships. The different strategic objectives of
these two companies resulted in additional insight into the role of
strategy.
The style of case study interview was a free flowing dialogue in
which the interviewee was encouraged to describe the technology
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transfer from his standpoint. At each of the companies an attempt was
made to interview three different individuals:
1. the program manager responsible for the technology transfer;
2. the senior manager typically at the vice president level
responsible for overseeing the resources used for conducting
the technology transfer; and
3. the business manager responsible for marketing and product
development related to the technology transfer.
In order to direct the conversation, a list of discussion items
was generated. These topics were used to spur conversation and as a
check against collection of the appropriate data. As the interviewee
told the story of the technology transfer roughly 75 percent of the
required information was gathered. In addition, this technique
resulted in many new and interesting topics that the author had not
anticipated.
The list of topics used for data gathering consisted of five areas;
1. company strategy,
2. communication networks,
3. organizational culture,
4. organizational structure, and
5. other relevant company concerns.
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The discussion outline was as follows:
1. Company strategy
A. Why this technology
B. What value was added by the technology transfer (what
did you gain, what did you add)
C. What drove the buy-versus-make decision for this
technology, could you have done this in-house.
D. Are your competitors trying to transfer this same
technology or develop it in-house.
E. Did you look at other ways of obtaining this technology
F. Did you have an immediate need for this technology for
some internal or commercial product.
G. How important to the company's future was this
technology.
H. What role does patent protection play in your interest
in technology transfer.
2. Communication Networks
A. Internal communications
1. How did you learn about this technology and its
availability.
2. Who initiated the technology transfer process.
3. How did you communicate internally the technology
availability and the potential benefits to various
product lines.
4. How did you disseminate the data as the technology
transfer occurred.
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5. What was the nature of your internal reviews at the
project level and at the manager level.
B. External communications
1. How did you establish initial communications with
the originating national laboratory
2. How did you maintain these communications during the
technology transfer process
3. Did you communicate with other companies or
competitors during the technology transfer process
about their transfer experiences
4. Did you hire people from outside to conduct the
technology transfer
5. What were the previous relationships between your
personnel and their counterparts at the national
laboratories
3. Organizational culture
A. What type of person does well within your company
B. Have you obtained technology from outside sources in
other areas (have you dealt with technology transfer
from other national laboratories and/or other
corporations)
C. How much of your innovation is internally generated
versus externally.
D. How are your employees evaluated.
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E. Who is responsible for evaluating technology transfer
and other alternatives for obtaining desired
capabilities.
F. Identify the key actors in the technology transfer.
1. the initiating scientists or engineer
2. the entrepreneur
3. the gatekeeper
4. the program manager
5. the sponsor
4. Organizational structure
A. Describe your organizations reporting chain.
B. Were any changes made to the reporting chain in order to
facilitate the technology transfer.
C. Were any changes made after the technology transfer in
your reporting chain that affected its application into
various products.
D. What level of approvals were required to initiate the
technology transfer.
E. Who controls the resources, both personnel and monetary.
F. How long did it take to initiate the technology transfer
from its inception.
G. Would you describe your organization as a
1. functional,
2. matrix, or
3. project.
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5. Other relevant company concerns
A. Have you attempted to transfer technology before, either
this technology or others.
B. How would this compare with other technology transfers
that you have been involved with.
C. Where did difficulties occur during the transfer
D. What was the most critical factor in successfully
conducting the transfer
E. What would you do different in your next attempt to
transfer technology.
F. Would you undertake another technology transfer.
G. The government is placing increasing emphasis on the
national laboratories being able to transfer
technology. Is this a good emphasis.
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CHAPTER V
CASE STUDIES
A. TRANSFER OF RADIATION-HARDENED MOLECULAR COMPOSITE TECHNOLOGY FROM
THE ADVANCED MATERIALS NATIONAL LABORATORY (AMNL)
AMNL developed the radiation-hardened molecular composite
technology as part of its basic research supporting the needs of NASA
and DOD. In order to prove the technology and supply NASA and DOD
with a limited number of parts, they established a low-rate production
facility at AMNL. By law, AMNL cannot be a supplier of hardware if an
alternative commercial source is available. For this reason, AMNL was
interested in finding a composite manufacturer to provide products
based on the technology.
The molecular composite technology was based on the
developed by Advanced Raw Materials Corporation (ARM).
their knowledge of radiation-hardened composites to the
and developed a high performance molecular composite.
80-85 design
AMNL applied
80-85 concept
A.1 Speciality Components Corporation (SCC)
Speciality Components Corporation's (SCC) primary business is
advanced composite structures. It is also a major manufacturer of
composite components and raw materials. SCC's major concern with the
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U.S. composite industry is a loss of world competitiveness. As the
Vice President of Marketing stated, "We need all the help we can
get." They participate in a Defense Science Board task force and
support consortia on composite manufacturing technologies.
SCC's working relationships with AMNL date back to the early 1960s
when they began developing radiation-hardened composites for various
satellite systems. AMNL was the lead developer of radiation-hardened
designs and SCC took the role of producing those designs after they
had been proven. SCC recognized early that they could not cover the
development of all radiation-hardened components and relied on
interfaces with AMNL to provide support in areas where they were not
spending internal resources. SCC picked up the 80-85 radiation-
hardened design because it filled a hole in their product line.
The radiation-hardened community is small and all participants
tend to know each other. For this reason a close working relationship
with AMNL is important to the overall SCC business in the radiation-
hardened components area. Security issues have resulted in relatively
limited competition among the radiation-hardened composite component
manufacturers. SCC believes being the first company to offer
radiation-hardened molecular composites, based on the AMNL technology,
they can discourage the competition from entering the small market for
such components.
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After transferring the 80-85 technology, SCC had the opportunity
to expand its product line into reinforced molecular composites using
new technology that AMNL was also developing. SCC believed they had
developed a sufficient understanding of the required technologies from
the 80-85 transfer. They decided to develop the reinforced technology
in-house. A decision was made not to pursue a technology transfer in
this area.
SCC stressed the fact that the transfer of technology from AMNL to
SCC benefited both parties. As SCC brought the technology on board,
they discovered many ways to improve both the process and
performance. SCC's extensive capabilities in radiation-hardened
composites led to the decision to use existing production equipment at
SCC rather than purchase facilities duplicating those at AMNL. This
resulted in process modifications that improved the overall
technology.
SCC stressed the importance of the good working relationships that
had been established in prior programs with the AMNL people. They
believe that if these relationships had not existed, the transfer
would likely have failed. Communications between the two
organizations were very good. Occasionally the technical specialists
would suffer the not-invented-here (NIH) syndrome because both
organizations were technically strong. These were typically short-
lived problems that did not impact the overall transfer.
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SCC had few difficulties with the transfer. Those they had
resulted from:
1) the capabilities of the personnel at AMNL being considerably
better than those of the manufacturing personnel at SCC.
2) people within the industry tend to be highly mobile and move
from company to company quite readily.
3) the familiarity of the two technical teams with each other
resulted in many undocumented contacts.
As noted by the people at SCC, the key to the technology transfer
is the knowledge that people carry with them. Usually documentation
alone is insufficient. The high mobility of the work force means that
a company cannot rely on the knowledge of people as its sole source of
information. SCC indicated they would spend more time and energy
working the details of documentation in future transfers in order to
reduce the impacts of labor mobility, uncontrolled contacts, and
differing skill levels.
All the personnel on the SCC project team came from internal
sources. They did not hire people from the outside to assist in this
technology transfer. The reason they did not bring people in from the
outside was that no one had transferred this technology before.
The transfer process was quite lengthy for SCC. Beginning in late
1980-early 1981, the transfer was not completed until 1984. Much of
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this was because of modifications to the technology that occurred at
SCC and AMNL.
When asked the question why not develop the capability in-house,
the issue was time and money. The radiation hardening of molecular
composites is a difficult task and SCC felt it would have taken
several more years to develop the technology themselves than it did to
transfer it. In addition, AMNL needed to find a second source and
provided incentives to SCC to take the technology.
SCC did not see patents and licensing agreements as an issue with
the technology transfer. They viewed this technology as moving
rapidly and they would have begun the next generation before patents
could be applied.
SCC saw AMNL as the creator of the marketplace. By developing the
capability to produce radiation-hardened components it enabled the DOD
and NASA system designers to take a new look at how to produce the
sophisticated composite structures for the next generation of
spacecraft.
A.2 Tomorrows Aerospace Systems Company (TAS)
Tomorrows Aerospace Systems Company (TAS) is a new entrant into
the advanced composite component business. TAS's primary business is
the development of advanced weapon systems and space vehicles. In the
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mid-1970s TAS conducted a customer survey in which it was suggested
that TAS needed a molecular composites capability in order to be
competitive in future systems.
The AMNL technology provided the proven technology that TAS
needed. TAS had a need for components that could not be obtained from
outside sources, i.e., commercial composite houses. TAS felt they
needed more control over obtaining molecular composites for their
systems than was currently being offered in the market place. Typical
commercial molecular composite manufacturers did not want to modify
their lines for the couple of hundred parts that TAS wanted to
purchase.
In the mid-1970s the corporation had two groups with molecular
composite capability, Midwest Aerospace and Southern Aerospace
divisions. A corporate decision was made in the late 1970s, early
1980s that Southern should be the focal point for all composites R&D.
The company then decided to go forward with a multi-million dollar
manufacturing facility located at Southern.
The people put in charge of the composites development program
recognized that it would be necessary to purchase a process for
manufacturing molecular composites. They were convinced that the
development of a process internally would be both costly and time
consuming. Their first step was to request proposals from various
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composites firms. By the end of 1981 a contract had been signed with
Centerteck, a division of Super Composite Structures Corporation (SCS).
TAS began transferring a 3-micron molecular composite technology
from Centerteck. About two years into the program SCS decided to
close down the Centerteck operation primarily due to an overcapacity
in the molecular composite industry, thus ending the transfer. TAS
then worked to find another source of the technology.
One of the key players from TAS Midwest Aerospace recognized a
need for radiation-hardened molecular composites in his applications.
He put forward the concept of working with AMNL in transferring the
80-85 radiation-hardened molecular composite technology and using it
as a stepping stone to higher performance composites. TAS knew that
AMNL had recently transferred this technology to SCC and YNIWMI, used
this knowledge to go after this technology.
TAS Southern made the decision to hire people from outside with
appropriate backgrounds in order to enhance the transfer of the
technology. Specifically, the program manager responsible for the
AMNL transfer was hired from YNIWMI. He had been involved at YNIWMI
in the transfer of the AMNL technology.
The individual hired from YNIWMI was technically accepted by the
radiation-hardened composite community. TAS knew the importance of
this since these people tend to be close business associates as well
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as personal friends, with a considerable amount of trust and respect
developed over years of working together. TAS Southern used the
gentleman from YNIWMI as an entry into these organizations.
TAS entered discussions with AMNL in 1983. It took more than 18
months to put together an agreement and the transfer has now been
underway about one year. They expect to take two to three years to
finish this transfer. It took more than a year for TAS to develop a
DOD sponsor for the transfer. This particular technology was
considered to be sensitive and transferred only to companies with a
need to know. TAS did not have a program that justified the need for
the radiation-hardened technology. They approached AMNL on the basis
of developing a process understanding not a product development.
After several delays, AMNL and TAS reached an agreement to transfer a
two-micron technology in 1985.
As TAS was bringing in the 2-micron process, AMNL was being passed
in feature size. A 1.25 micron capability is currently in development
and is expected to be commercially available before long. The process
that TAS is transferring probably will not be transferable to higher-
performance molecular composites. TAS has recognized this and will
use this transfer as a stepping stone toward developing an internal
capability. Plans are to provide second sourcing to AMNL for
radiation-hardened components once the transfer is complete.
Meanwhile, TAS has gone to the commercial sector with a request for
proposals on transferring the next generation of molecular composites.
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One issue that has caused difficulty for TAS in transferring the
process is the difference in skill levels between the personnel at
AMNL and TAS. TAS is attempting to bring the process into a
commercially viable component manufacturing business. This means that
the skill level of people running the various pieces of equipment are
technicians not engineers and scientists. Those at AMNL tend to be
engineering oriented with a very strong research background. TAS is
working closely with AMNL in this regard and trying to determine
better specifications by which to operate the machinery. The hope is
that better documentation will reduce the impact of the differing
skill levels.
A key feature of the transfer process is that it is a two-way
street where both parties benefit from technology improvements. As
TAS develops the capability and the process internally, they find
difficulties with the AMNL technology and develop solutions to those
problems. This information is then transmitted back to AMNL for
inclusion in their processes. Considerable amounts of technical
interchange occur both ways. TAS feels that AMNL needs stronger and
tighter controls in the manufacturing process and that they have
helped provide data to improve those controls.
Issues of patents and licensing rights agreements have not played
a role in this process transfer. TAS felt that the technology is in a
high state of transition and that any patents or licensing agreements
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would essentially be overridden in a very short period by future
development.
TAS recognized that in order to gain the most from the transfer
process, it would be best to work with an organization that has been
through a technology transfer previously. This weighed heavily in the
decision to go with AMNL. TAS also recognized that to gain the most
from the transfer, the appropriate amount of internal attention would
have to be focused on the transfer. To do this, they modified their
matrix organization and gave complete program control to the micro
composites functional group.
This is the largest sum of money TAS has ever spent on a
particular technology. TAS recognizes that this will be a long term
return on investment. The need for a quick entry into this
technology, TAS feels, justifies the cost. TAS is pleased with the
transfer process thus far and probably would not make many changes in
doing another transfer.
A.3 YNIWMI Corporation (YNIWMI)
The YNIWMI Corp. is a large holding company with interests in a
broad variety of areas ranging from electronics to household
appliances. They have an aerospace group which focuses on large DOD
composite systems. YNIWMI is involved in many sophisticated satellite
and radar system programs for DOD and NASA.
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In the late 1970s, YNIWMI foresaw a need for high-performance
molecular composites. They began both internal studies and external
contracts to acquire the capability. YNIWMI used external contracts
to see what capabilities existed within the industry and the national
laboratory system. AMNL had published the results of their radiation-
hardened molecular composite studies. YNIWMI saw that this technology
fit well with their plan for developing a molecular composite
capability.
As YNIWMI began studying the possibility of acquiring the
technology from an outside source, cost became a major consideration.
They had assessed from previous transfers that the internal cost of
the transfer process was independent of where the technology came
from. The only difference would be the price paid for the
technology. The cost of technology from AMNL was less than one-sixth
that from a commercial composite company. In addition to the cost,
AMNL technology would be available well ahead of any industry
suppliers.
Having recently finished a transfer of technology from their
research laboratories to the production facility, YNIWMI learned some
of the problems in technology transfer. They found that the research
people tended to operate in their own unique world and could not
communicate with the production people. AMNL had gone through the
process steps involved in bringing up a production line for this
3-micron technology. YNIWMI found this experience to be extremely
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beneficial in facilitating the transfer. The experience base of the
organization which the technology was being transferred from is an
important factor. If they were to do a technology transfer again this
is something that they would strongly consider.
The driving force behind the YNIWMI transfer was the general
manager of the military composite components group. He had, after
conducting a study in the late 1970s, seen that higher performance was
going to be important to the future of the composites industry. He
assessed that in order to supply the future needs of his internal
customers he needed to develop a molecular component capability. He
put together a seven-year plan to obtain the technology.
As YNIWMI began the development of this capability, the composites
industry went through a very rapid change. It went quickly from
7-micron to 2-micron performance. In addition the industry was
developing commercial high volume manufacturing facilities which were
capable of producing millions of parts at a very low cost. These
parts had many commercial applications and the limited custom parts
needed for DOD and NASA programs were typically less profitable. What
was unforeseen was the fact that within a few years the composite
industry would have tremendous over-capacity and that the mass
production facilities would make space available for custom component
development.
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The government forecasted need for radiation-hardened molecular
composites changed and higher performance became more important than
radiation hardening. As a result more commercial products were made
available for use in the DOD and NASA programs. YNIWMI decided it
would be more cost effective to purchase the few radiation-hardened
components they needed from outside sources.
YNIWMI went through a reorganization and the general manager in
charge of military composites left the corporation. Upon his
departure, the custom molecular composites group disbanded and all of
the technology was transferred to other programs. The production line
of the custom molecular composites was shut down. YNIWMI took some of
the knowledge they gained from AMNL (by transferring people) and
placed it at their commercial production facility. They were working
on a commercial 1.25-micron technology and were well ahead of the
seven-year plan.
At the beginning of the technology transfer, YNIWMI was aware that
another company was in the process of obtaining the AMNL technology.
YNIWMI did not know who the other company was and did not make an
attempt to talk with the other company regarding lessons learned from
the transfer process. They noted that in 1983, when TAS got involved
with the technology transfer from AMNL, TAS held many conversations
with YNIWMI on how to improve the transfer process. The people at
YNIWMI recommended this as a very valuable step in working out the
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details of the technology transfer. If they had had more experience
in technology transfer they may have attempted similar conversations.
YNIWMI is divided into functional organizations. The composite
component group was responsible as a service organization to provide
parts built to specifications to their internal customers. The design
group was separate from the process group and was responsible for
designing the molecular composite components. This type of
organization resulted in a unique arrangement between YNIWMI and
AMNL. Separate agreements were established for the design and
manufacturing groups. YNIWMI found this to be advantageous in that
when problems arose they could quickly assess whether it was at the
design or process level.
To facilitate communications, AMNL had encouraged YNIWMI to place
some individuals on assignment at AMNL during the transfer. YNIWMI
did not feel they had the personnel or the resources to do this and
conducted the transfer through meetings and seminars on a monthly
basis. Looking back upon the transfer YNIWMI probably would send
somebody to AMNL during the transfer process to observe and document
any changes in process as well as to better understand the AMNL
organization.
YNIWMI provided technology back to AMNL during the transfer that
improved the molecular composite technology. They discovered
processes based on their internal R&D that improved produceability.
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As a result of the transfer AMNL contracted with YNIWMI to improve
other technologies.
The timeframes involved in getting the technology from AMNL were:
six months for YNIWMI to make an internal decision to go ahead,
another year to 18 months to develop the agreements, and then roughly
3 years of transferring the technology. Although the transfer was not
completed, YNIWMI had obtained most of the capability they wanted.
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B. TRANSFER OF SEVERAL TECHNOLOGIES FROM
DIFFERENT NATIONAL LABORATORIES
B.1 Limited Propulsion Corporation (LPC)
Limited Propulsion Corporation (LPC) is the world's largest
independent transmission manufacturer. Most of their transmissions
are used for large semi tractor-trailer trucks. They consider
themselves to be in a mature industry which has relied in recent years
on product improvements rather than new inventions for increased
performance.
Recently, the focus in advancing the performance of the
transmissions has been in the area of increased gear and cooling
efficiency based primarily on sophisticated clutching and hydraulic
transfer mechanisms with some work in advanced high pressure transfer
boxes.
About four years ago LPC hired an individual whose previous work
experience had been in weapons design at Far West National Laboratories
(FWNL). He had an interest in bringing advanced material technology
into the transmission community and for family reasons wanted to work
in the Midwest. LPC provided a perfect opportunity for him to satisfy
both goals. His work experience at the FWNL gave him significant
contacts at many other national laboratories. His contacts at
Advanced Energy Systems National Laboratory's (AESNL) Materials
Research Group was important in satisfying LPC's needs. It was his
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intent to make use of these contacts to improve the materials R&D
capability at LPC.
Beginning in mid-1982, he started technology interchanges with the
national laboratories. This campaign was waged by means of technical
white papers. In the white papers, LPC described the needs of current
and future transmissions and submitted them to several of the D.O.E.
laboratories. The laboratories were asked to comment on how they
might address the problems stated in the white papers.
It took roughly two years from the time of the initial white paper
writing campaign before a significant technology was discovered that
lead to a technology transfer. LPC emphasized the importance of the
white papers in developing the technology transfer process in that
they provided a non- threatening mechanism for forming personal
interactions between LPC and the national laboratories. It was
important that a level of trust be developed between the two
organizations.
As interactions with the national laboratories developed LPC hired
additional individuals. Some of these people were hired out of the
national laboratory system. LPC was coming from a position of
virtually no capability in basic materials technology. They had
relied heavily on material suppliers to conduct the R&D needed for
transmission components. With a new emphasis on application of new
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materials LPC is attempting to develop an in-house capability and to
integrate backward into materials development.
LPC has established a unique contractual agreement with AESNL to
license the inter-metallic metals technology for application in
transmissions. This agreement is a limited rights license for non-
automotive transmissions over eight gears. The license gives LPC the
sole authority for using the inter-metallic metals technology in these
transmissions. LPC made use of proprietary rights agreements that
other companies used with AESNL in establishing the license.
LPC has used their relationship with AESNL to obtain contracts at
AESNL and other laboratories in advanced materials application. These
funds are small but provide money that allows LPC to leverage their
own R&D resources. This is new for LPC but they are finding it
extremely beneficial in developing a critical mass required for
research.
The technical manager indicated no difficulties in working with
AESNL, except for the limited resources LPC was applying to the
program. He felt that the technology transfer would go better if he
had one to two people working full time on this project. Currently
his activities are split between four or five different tasks, making
it difficult to achieve the necessary critical mass. He indicated
that quite frequently programmatic issues take precedence over the
research and development taking away from the technology transfer. The
-59-
technical manager stated that "it is tough to avoid a hobby shop
environment on the program." This was of concern to him and felt that
the program would benefit from additional resources.
It took close to two years for AESNL and LPC to come to a formal
agreement on licensing of this technology. Limited technology
transfer did begin prior to the formal agreements being signed. The
progress has been slow because of long lead times required in
obtaining raw material. Data is just beginning to come in. The
material's performance looks promising but is not overwhelming. They
hope to have a product available by 1991, but there has been no
company commitment beyond near-term testing.
LPC feels that it is too early to assess whether the technology
transfer had been successful. The feeling was very positive about
what has been accomplished to this point. Even if the material does
not turn out to be viable for transmissions, LPC will have benefited
from the increased knowledge in materials that can be applied to
future programs.
B.2 Leading Edge Mature Products Company (LEMP)
The Leading Edge Mature Products Company (LEMP) is divided into
four major operating divisions; Rubber, Energy, Steel, and
Electronics. Over the last four or five years, LEMP has foreseen a
need to change the direction of their corporation. Their existing
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products were mature and facing stiff competition. They saw a need to
expand into new areas. With this in mind LEMP turned to R&D
activities to assess future business opportunities for the corporation.
LEMP examined 25 R&D programs in different business areas. Of
these 25 business areas, five were associated with technology transfer
from the national laboratories. They established a 2-3 year plan
where the 25 technologies received further evaluation with an
objective of reducing the number of R&D projects to not more than ten
by the beginning of 1987. LEMP would, in 1987, increase the R&D
funding on the remaining products.
LEMP and AESNL have a long-lasting relationship based on early
work in energy and rubber. As a result of this interaction with
AESNL, a team had been established to further evaluate opportunities
at AESNL for LEMP. This team was originally put together to consider
bidding the AESNL management contract. After LEMP made a decision not
to bid the contract, they were invited to help with the proposal
evaluations. LEMP was aware that one of the winning criteria was a
technology transfer program by the managing corporation.
LEMP established a local office located at AESNL headed by Dr.
John Smith. Dr. Smith had been very involved with AESNL over a number
of years and had a long history of both public service and corporate
work experience. It was decided that he needed to report directly to
the President of the corporation. He had to have overall corporate
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visibility so that he could assess potential technology transfers for
the four operating divisions. Dr. Smith had extensive technical
experience and was a renowned expert in metal technology which gave
him credibility both inside and outside the corporation.
Dr. Smith's objective was to identify common areas of R&D
interest with the national laboratories. This enabled LEMP to
leverage their resources and examine areas that would not have been
possible without the national laboratories' help. LEMP wanted to
cover as large an area as possible during the first two years of the
R&D plan. The national laboratories provided an excellent window on
many state-of-the-art technologies.
The recent legislative changes that allow for the protection of
patent rights by a company who is working with the national laboratory
was incentive for LEMP to build up their research interests. To LEMP
the patent issue was very important as most of the products they make
have long lead development and/or have long production lives. Because
AESNL had just gone through a management change with an emphasis now
being placed on technology transfer LEMP saw an opportunity to test
the new patent laws.
Beginning in 1983, LEMP began to negotiate patent protection
agreements with AESNL on three or four different programs. It took
more than a year to establish formal agreements. These, as far as
LEMP knows, were the first agreements that allowed the protection of
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intellectual rights by a company contracting with the national
laboratories on joint research.
Of the ten remaining programs, none of the five interchanges with
the national laboratories are being pursued. There are two programs
that are being continued with the national laboratories at this time
because they were committed to for the following year. LEMP does not
intend to pursue these programs beyond the remaining contractual
commitment. The decision to divest the steel business had the largest
impact on not pursuing technology from the national laboratories.
Four of the five programs that LEMP had with national laboratories
were in the steel division.
LEMP discovered in their technology transfer that a critical mass
was required when dealing with the national laboratories. It took a
certain number of people to guarantee technology transfer would take
place. As a minimum, they recommended that one man be assigned full
time to each project.
LEMP likes to emphasize to its new people that they are an
externally oriented company that is not afraid to communicate with
scientists in other organizations particularly the national
laboratories. They feel this provides interesting and exciting
challenges to the new hires. By doing this they hope not to duplicate
work being done by others and leverage their R&D as much as possible.
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LEMP believed very strongly that technology transfer goes two
ways, with both organizations providing insights into a technology.
LEMP, with its vast materials processing experience, was able to
provide insights into the inter-metallic metals technology at AESNL.
By doing this they improved the process and added value to this new
technology. As these working relationships develop, they become a
fraternal bond between the scientists at the national laboratories and
those at the company. Quoting a LEMP employee,
"This bond is one in which you want to see your
counterpart doing well. You want to do things that will
help him progress within his own organization. A
management that promotes this type of activity is able to
reap the benefits of technology transfer."
Even though LEMP has decided not to pursue the five technologies
they were transferring from the national laboratories, they view the
relationship with the national laboratories as very important and
foresee future relationships with the national laboratories as needs
require.
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CHAPTER VI
COMPARISON OF THE CASE STUDIES
A comparison of the case studies offers an opportunity to assess
the critical factors in technology transfer. This comparison provides
insights into how companies go about establishing a technology
transfer program as well as why a company would be interested in
conducting such a transfer. As a starting point Table VI-1 provides a
framework by which a comparative analysis of the case studies can be
conducted. This was developed from the discussion items outlined in
Chapter IV. Table VI-2 is a tabulation of the results of the case
studies. These two tables combined provide for a visual comparison
and summary of the activities involved in a technology transfer.
As can be seen at an initial glance, there is little consistency
in how each company conducted its technology transfer. In each of
these cases the company believes that the technology transfer was
successful although outside observers may argue that in two of the
cases the transfer was not totally successful because the companies
did not bring products to the market place. These two companies
believe that they did receive substantial benefits from the technology
transfer and have made application of portions of the technology
elsewhere in their company product lines.
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Table VI.1 Comparative Issues
I. COMPANY STRATEGY
A. IMPORTANCE OF PATENTS
O - VERY IMPORTANT
O - OF INTEREST BUT NOT A DECIDING FACTOR
A - WAS NOT CONSIDERED
B. CONSIDERATION OF OTHER SOURCES
O - LOOKED AT INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SOURCES
O - CONSIDERED ONLY EXTERNAL SOURCES
A - WAS ONLY INTERESTED IN NATIONAL LABORATORIES
TECHNOLOGY
C. CRITICALITY OF TECHNOLOGY
O - EXTREMENLY IMPORTANT WITH LARGE INVESTMENT
O - IMPORTANT FOR FUTURE GROWTH
A - IMPORTANT FOR FUTURE GROWTH
* - IMPORTANT BUT NOT ESSENTIAL
i - INTERESTING AS AN EXPLORATION FOR NEW OPPORTUNITIES
D. BUY VS. MAKE
O - LACKED CAPABILITY
o - HAD CAPABILITY BUT WANTED ADDITIONAL CREDIBILITY
A - SAW ADVANTAGES IN DEVELOPMENT COST AND TIME
E. COMPETITION ESTABLISHING CAPABILITY
O - COMPETITION DEVELOPING TECHNOLOGY EITHER INTERNALLY
OR FROM A SOURCE OTHER THAN NATIONAL LABORATORY
EO - COMPETITION GETTING SIMILAR TECHNOLOGY FROM NATIONAL
LABORATORY
A - COMPETITION NOT DEVELOPING TECHNOLOGY
F. ADDING VALUE
O - DEVELOPING INTERNAL CAPABILITY (TECHNOLOGY
UNDERSTANDING)
[ - ADDING TO PRODUCT LINE
A - MODIFYING/IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY
G. BUSINESS RELATIONS WITH NATIONAL LABORATORY
O - WAS A CONTRACTOR TO NATIONAL LAB PRIOR TO TRANSFER
O - BECAME A CONTRACTOR AFTER TRANSFER BEGAN
A - HAD BEEN INVOLVED WITH NATIONAL LABS ACTING AS A
THIRD PARTY TECHNICAL ADVISOR
* - HAVE HAD NO OTHER BUSINESS ARRANGEMENT
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Table VI.1 (continued)
II. COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
A. INTERNAL
1. DISCOVERER OF TECHNOLOGY
O - TECHNICAL PERSON
O - MANAGER
A - EXTERNAL INPUT
2. INITIATOR OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
O - TECHNICAL PERSON
o - MANAGER
A - EXTERNAL (CORPORATE INFLUENCE)
3. INTERNAL DISSEMINATION OF DATA
O - VERBAL ONLY (NOT FORMATED OR CONTROLLED, AS NEEDED)
O - REGULAR SCHEDULED MEETINGS
A - WRITTEN DOCUMENTATION
() - WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT
S- TO ALL INTERESTED DEPARTMENTS
4. FREQUENCY OF GROUP MEETINGS
a) MANAGEMENT LEVEL
O - NOT PLANNED, AS NEEDED
O - LESS THAN ONCE PER MONTH
& - MORE THAN ONCE PER MONTH
b) TECHNICAL LEVEL
O - NOT PLANNED. AS NEEDED
O - LESS THAN ONCE PER MONTH
A - MORE THAN ONCE PER MONTH BUT LESS THAN ONCE PER
WEEK
() - AT LEAST ONCE PER WEEK
B. EXTERNAL
1. CONTACTS AT NATIONAL LABS
a) INITIATING
O - MANAGEMENT LEVEL
O - TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER GROUP
A - TECHNICAL LEVEL
b) DURING TRANSFER
O - MANAGEMENT LEVEL
O - TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER GROUP
A - TECHNICAL LEVEL
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Table VI.1 (continued)
2. FREQUENCY OF GROUP MEETING WITH NATIONAL LABS
a) MANAGEMENT LEVEL
O - NOT SCHEDULED, ONLY AS NEEDED
0 - MORE THAN ONCE PER YEAR
A - MORE THAN ONCE PER MONTH
b) TECHNICAL LEVEL
O - NOT SCHEDULEDj ONLY AS NEEDED
[] - LESS THAN ONCE PER MONTH
A - MORE THAN ONCE PER MONTH
3. TYPE OF COMMUNICATION WITH NATIONAL LABS
O - INFORMAL VERBAL ONLY
[] - INFORMAL WRITTEN AND VERBAL
A - SCHEDULED MEETINGS
* - DOCUMENTATION SUCH AS SPECIFICATIONS
4. DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER COMPANIES
O - DID NOT ATTEMPT BECAUSE NOT AWARE OF ANY OTHERS
[] - DID NOT ATTEMPT BECAUSE OF COMPETITION
A - DID NOT ATTEMPT BECAUSE COULD SEE NO VALUE
* - DID TALK WITH OTHER COMANIES
III. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
A. WHERE DID HUMAN RESOURCES COME FROM
1. INITIATING PHASE
O - INTERNAL TO COMPANY
[] - FROM ANOTHER COMPANY WITH TECHNOLOGY EXPERIENCE
A - FROM A NATIONAL LAB
* - FROM THE SOURCE NATIONAL LAB
2. TRANSFER PHASE
O - INTERNAL TO COMPANY
] - FROM ANOTHER COMPANY WITH TECHNOLOGY EXPERIENCE
A - FROM A NATIONAL LAB
* - FROM THE SOURCE NATIONAL LAB
B. USE OF OTHER OUTSIDE TRANSFER
O - HAVE NOT DONE OUTSIDE TRANSFER BEFORE
O - HAVE MADE USE OF ONLY LIMITED SUPPLIER AND UNIVERSITY
RESOURCES
A - HAVE WORKED WITH OTHER COMPANIES
* - HAVE TRANSFERRED DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGIES FROM THE SAME
NATIONAL LAB
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Table VI.l (continued)
C. ISSUE OF NOT-INVENTED-HERE, N.I.H.
O - WAS NOT AN ISSUE
O - WAS OF CONCERN BUT NOT IMPORTANT
A - DID CREATE SOME TENSION AT TECHNICAL LEVEL
D. TYPE OF PERSON WHO DOES WELL
O - RISK TAKER, ENTREPRENEUR
O - MANAGER, ORGANIZES AND SPONSORS ACTIVITIES
A - DEPENDABLE AND CONSISTENT
E. NUMBER OF PEOPLE INVOLVED IN TRANSFER
O - ONE OR LESS FULL TIME
[] - ONE OR LESS FULL TIME PLUS PART TIME HELP
A - MORE THAN ONE FULL TIME BUT LESS THAN 10
* - MORE THAN 10 FULL TIME
F. FIVE CRITICAL ROLE INVOLVEMENT
O - GATEKEEPER
[]- SPONSOR
A - PROGRAM MANAGER
S- ENTREPRENEUR
* - INITIATING SCIENTIST OR ENGINEER
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
A. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION
O - FUNCTIONAL
D- MATRIX FAVORING FUNCTIONAL
A - MATRIX
() - MATRIX FAVORING PROJECT
S- PROJECT
B. CHANGES IN STRUCTURE
O - DID NOT OCCUR
[] - WAS DONE TO FACILITATE TRANSFER
A - OCCURRED AFTER TRANSFER
C. CONTROLLER OF RESOURCES
O - DIVISION PRODUCT MANAGER (V.P. LEVEL)
] - DIVISION FUNCTIONAL MANAGER (V.P. LEVEL)
A - PROGRAM MANAGER
D. RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION
O - TECHNICAL MANAGER
] - PROGRAM MANAGER
A - DIVISONAL PRODUCT MANAGER (V.P. LEVEL)
S- DIVISIONAL FUNCTIONAL MANAGER (V.P. LEVEL)
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Table VI.1 (continued)
E. TIME FRAME OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
1. INITIATING PHASE INTERNAL (MONTHS)
2. ESTABLISHING AGREEMENTS PHASE (MONTHS)
3. TRANSFER PROCESS PHASE (MONTHS)
4. WAS THERE OVERLAP IN TIMING
O - NO
D - ONLY BETWEEN PHASE 1 AND 2
A - ONLY BETWEEN PHASE 2 AND 3
0 - YES IN ALL PHASES
V. OTHER RELEVANT COMPANY CONCERNS
A. MOST CRITICAL FACTOR IN TRANSFER
O - INTERNAL COMMUNICATION AND COMMITTMENT
[] - COMMUNICATION WITH NATIONAL LABS
A - DOCUMENTATION FROM NATIONAL LABS
O - SUPPORT FROM NATIONAL LABS
B. COMPARISON WITH OTHER TRANSFER ATTEMPTS
O - GOOD
[] - FAIR
A - BAD
C. WAS TRANSFER SUCCESSFUL
O - TRANSFER NOT COMPLETED BUT PROGRESSING WELL
[] - YES, WITH NEW PRODUCTS BEING AVAILABLE
A - YES, BUT NOT PRODUCING PRODUCTS, HAVE USED THE
TECHNOLOGY FOR KNOWLEDGE ENHANCEMENT
* - NO, WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY
D. WOULD YOU DO ANOTHER TRANSFER
O - YES
] - ONLY IF TECHNOLOGY WAS REALLY NEEDED
A - NO
E. WHAT WOULD YOU DO DIFFERENT NEXT TIME
O - NOTHING
[] - BE SURE OF DOCUMENTATATION
A - PLACE SOMEONE AT NATIONAL LAB
* - OBTAIN STRONGER INTERNAL COMMITTMENT
F. CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POLICIES REGARDING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
O - ARE GOOD
[ - ARE GOOD BUT NATIONAL LABS NEED TO BECOME MORE AWARE
OF INDUSTRY NEEDS
A - ARE GOOD AND WOULD NOT HAVE PURSUED TRANSFER WITHOUT
THEM
* - IS OF NO VALUE
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Table VI-2. Comparison of Companies and Issues
SCC TAS YMIWMI LEMP LPC
I. COMPANY STRATEGY
A. IMPORTANCE OF PATENTS
B. CONSIDERATION OF OTHER SOURCES
C. CRITICALITY OF TECHNOLOGY
D. BUY VERSUS MAKE
E. COMPETITION ESTABLISHED
CAPABILITY
F. ADDING VALUE
G. BUSINESS RELATIONS WITH
NATIONAL LABORATORY
II. COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
A. INTERNAL
1. DISCOVERER OF TECHNOLOGY
2. INITIATOR OF TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
3. INTERNAL DISSEMINATION OF
DATA
4. FREQUENCY OF GROUP MEETINGS
a) MANAGEMENT LEVEL
b) TECHNICAL LEVEL
B. EXTERNAL
1. CONTACTS AT NATIONAL LABS
a) INITIATING
b) DURING TRANSFER
2. FREQUENCY OF GROUP MEETING
WITH NATIONAL LABORATORIES
a) MANAGEMENT
b) TECHNICAL
3. TYPE OF COMMUNICATION WITH
NATIONAL LABORATORIES
4. DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER
COMPANIES
III. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
A. WHERE DID HUMAN RESOURCES
1. INITIATNG PHASE
2. TRANSFER PHASE
B. USE OF OTHER OUTSIDE TRANSFERS
C. ISSUE OF "NOT INVENTED HERE",
D. TYPE OF PERSON WHO DOES WELL
E. NUMBER OF PEOPLE INVOLVED IN
TRANSFER
F. FIVE CRITICAL ROLE INVOLVEMENT
A
A
C
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Table VI-2. Comparison of Companies and Issues (continued)
SCC TAS YMIWMI LEMP LPC
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
A. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION
B. CHANGES IN STRUCTURE
C. CONTROLLER OF RESOURCES
D. RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOURCE
ALLOCATION
E. TIME FRAME OF TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
1. INITIATING PHASE (INTERNAL)
2. ESTABLISHING AGREEMENTS
3. TRANSFER PROCESS
4. WAS THERE OVERLAP IN TIMING
V. OTHER RELEVANT COMPANY CONCERNS
A. MOST CRITICAL FACTOR IN TRANSFER
B. COMPARISON WITH OTHER TRANSFER
ATTEMPTS
C. WAS TRANSFER SUCCESSFUL
D. WOULD YOU DO ANOTHER TRANSFER
E. WHAT WOULD YOU DO DIFFERENT NEXT
TIME
F. CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POLICIES
REGARDING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
r1
O0[]
12
1848
A
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O
9
12
18
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O
O
O00
0
0
6
12
48
A
O
SA
DA0[] b
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A
6
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0
0
A
* LEMP had a permanently assigned individual
who had management as well as technical
contacts at the national laboratory.
O
O
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12
0
0O
O
O
0
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In the remainder of the section we will focus the comparison
primarily on the three companies transferring a single technology. We
will bring in observations resulting from the other two case studies
as they apply to the area of discussion.
SCC had a unique strategic interest in radiation-hardened
molecular composites. SCC has a long history working in the
radiation-hardened composite components but had no molecular composite
capability. They had worked closely with AMNL on several projects for
more than 15 years. They felt quite comfortable with the radiation-
hardened technology and were interested in radiation-hardened
molecular composite technology in order to market a specific product
that AMNL had developed. SCC supplied components to many of the
system contractors and also for their own internal use. They needed
the radiation-hardened 80-85 molecular composite technology to fill
out their production. Having worked with AMNL for many years, SCC
knew that AMNL did not have a charter for the production of composite
components. SCC obtained the technology to become the primary source
of the radiation-hardened 80-85 molecular composite in an attempt to
limit competition by being the only full product line producer.
TAS and YNIWMI were primarily interested in the molecular
composite technology as a stepping stone to high performance
composites. Their goals were different from SCC.
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YNIWMI had established a five-year plan for their government
composites group to increase performance of their composite
components. The general manager of the government composites group
saw an opportunity to obtain high performance molecular composites
from AMNL. SCC had just begun the transfer process and AMNL wanted
competing sources for the technology. Therefore, AMNL was very
interested in working with YNIWMI.
The YNIWMI plan was to obtain the reduced feature size 3 micron
technology from AMNL as a mid-level stepping stone for increased
performance composite components. The end objective was to get to
1.25 micron. Whether the AMNL process would allow them to obtain that
objective was not clear but they needed stepping stones to get from 7
micron to 1.25.
YNIWMI was not interested in the 80-85 molecular composite as a
product. They were interested in the general processing
requirements. In order to transfer the technology they had to produce
the 80-85 molecular composite to verify that the process had been
successfully transferred. This gave them a product that they could
market. YNIWMI saw this an a side benefit to the transfer since, as
this transfer was occurring, government studies indicated an increased
need for radiation-hardening technology. A cost analysis indicated
that technology transfer from AMNL would not be any more expensive for
the company than transferring the technology from their internal
research laboratories and would be as little as one-sixth the cost of
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purchasing the technology from a composites company. In addition it
was believed that it would take an additional two years for YNIWMI's
research laboratory to develop equivalent technology. For cost and
time reasons YNIWMI decided to use the AMNL technology as a stepping
stone to their end objective.
By the time YNIWMI had finished most of the technology transfer,
the required level of radiation hardening by the government was
dropped in favor of higher performance. It became clear that the
3-micron AMNL process could not be reduced down to 1.25 micron. In
addition, a significant change had occurred in the composites
industry. The development of commercial high-volume production
facilities totally changed how composite companies conducted business.
The manager who had brought the AMNL process to YNIWMI left the
company and his replacement put more emphasis on higher performance.
YNIWMI discontinued the technology transfer and acquired a company
which was developing 1.25 micron capability. Some of the lessons
learned from the AMNL process were transferred to this company and
YNIWMI won a government contract to develop molecular composites at
1.25 micron.
TAS followed YNIWMI by several years in the acquisition of the
radiation-hardened molecular composite technology. The 3-micron
technology had been well established at AMNL and the 2-micron process
was being finalized. TAS went directly after the 2-micron performance
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capability. TAS's objectives were similar to YNIWMI's in that they
were interested in using the technology as a stepping stone to higher
performance. By this time, it was clear that the 3- and 2-micron
processes were not amenable to further performance improvements. AMNL
contracted a study to produce a 1.25 micron capability.
TAS decided that the only way to enter the composite components
business was to do it in customized components. The primary objective
was to develop an internal capability so that the corporation would
not have to rely on external suppliers. The company had difficulty
getting products in recent years from commercial manufacturers. TAS
had been attempting to transfer the 3-micron capability from
commercial sources, but its parent company decided to close down the
operation because it had become uncompetitive. This left TAS with a
need to obtain the technology from another source.
TAS sent out requests for proposals to various companies as well
as AMNL. Midwest Aerospace Division of TAS had a need for
radiation-hardened molecular composites. TAS contacted YNIWMI to
assess their success and decided to transfer the 2-micron,
radiation-hardened technology from AMNL and use it as a stepping stone
to the higher performance. They recognized that the 2- micron process
would not be transferable to 1.25 micron but felt it was a good
starting point. In addition, they could offer customized molecular
composites for specialty needs and possibly recoup some of the costs
of the transfer.
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All three companies had different strategic objectives in
obtaining the radiation- hardened molecular composite technology.
These different objectives have one common feature: each company was
seeking a capability they did not have. SCC was seeking technology
for radiation-hardened molecular composites, YNIWMI and TAS were
seeking technology for increased performance composites processing.
In none of the cases did AMNL take the initiative in trying to sell
the technology. Each of the companies approached AMNL about obtaining
that capability.
In all five cases the companies went to the national laboratories
seeking technology. LEMP had an interest in looking at future
technologies and setting up joint R&D with the national laboratories
in the hope of finding new product lines. LEMP saw itself in a
maturing industry and needed to find new technology to move the
corporation forward. LPC also found themselves in a maturing
industry. They saw an opportunity to integrate a feature into the
design phase of transmission development. This had not been done
previously. To do this they needed the assistance of material
research specialists that resided at the national laboratories.
How each of the companies discovered the particular technologies
of interest varied significantly. SCC had had a long association with
AMNL as a contractor. AMNL's success in the molecular composite
technology was well known in the radiation hardening community. SCC
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used this long-standing relationship to establish the need for
technology transfer.
YNIWMI had no such history in dealing with AMNL. They knew most
of the people at AMNL through contracts with other government
agencies. AMNL acted as a technical advisor to several agencies.
YNIWMI was in the marketplace looking for higher performance composite
component technology and had seen several publications in technical
journals by AMNL describing their successes.
TAS found out about the 3 and 2 micron molecular composite
technology through contacts at its Midwest Aerospace Division.
Midwest was working with AMNL on contracts to another government
agency. When TAS needed to take the next step in their long range
plan, AMNL came to the top as a logical source.
LEMP had long-standing relationships with AESNL. As LEMP saw a
need to modify their business, they decided to take advantage of the
technical resources at the national laboratories and placed an
individual at AESNL. His full-time job was to look for common areas
of research interest with AESNL and the other national laboratories.
This was probably the most unique and aggressive fashion of obtaining
technology transfer information.
LEMP was interested in obtaining potential new business lines and
was conducting both internal research as well as working with the
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national laboratories. When the decision was made to focus on a
limited number of these business opportunities the technologies being
transferred from the national laboratories were dropped. This does
not mean that the technology transfer was unsuccessful.
LPC started obtaining technology from national laboratories by
holding technical discussions on the problems associated with advanced
transmission designs. They did not go in seeking contracts but looked
for areas where the national laboratories could possibly help. LPC
was the only company in the case studies that did not have previous
experience with the national laboratories. Therefore it was important
for them to develop a trust and a working relationship prior to
beginning any technology transfer. One approach was to hire people
with contacts at the national laboratories. This is the reason that
it took LPC longer than the other companies to initiate the technology
transfer.
LEMP, YNIWMI, and SCC had substantial internal capabilities in the
technical area. TAS and LPC did not. In order to develop the
capability and to establish some credibility with the national
laboratory both of these companies hired resources from outside the
company. These people had either worked with the technology or the
national laboratory previously. This was viewed by both companies as
a significant and important step in establishing the credibility
needed to successfully transfer technology. Although neither of these
companies have completed the technology transfer, they are very
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pleased with the progress being made. It would be of interest to
pursue these at a later date and see how successful the transfer was.
Both LPC and LEMP were extremely interested in the new patent
agreements with the national laboratories that were available due to
changes in government regulations. LEMP began in 1983 to establish
patent protection agreements with AESNL. Both AESNL and LEMP learned
extensively from this interaction. LEMP used the agreements to go to
other national laboratories. AESNL used these agreements in
establishing proprietary rights with LPC and other companies.
LPC took the patent agreements one step further and established
limited licensing agreements. This is something that had not been
done previously with the national laboratories and is being used as a
model for future agreements. Both LEMP and LPC indicated that they
would not have progressed as far as they did had these patent and
limited rights agreements not been available. On the other hand TAS,
SCC and YNIWMI saw no value in limited rights and patent protection
agreements. The primary reason was that each of these companies saw
the technology as changing rapidly enough that patents would have been
of minimal or no value and would have delayed the process of obtaining
the technology.
The previous working relationships between SCC and AMNL resulted
in SCC making fewer personal contacts at AMNL and relying more heavily
on documentation. They found this to be difficult at times because
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the documentation at AMNL was incomplete. The technology was still
being developed at the time of the transfer. SCC also was interested
in modifying the technology to their manufacturing equipment. The net
effect was technology being transferred in both directions.
YNIWMI had found that working with AMNL was significantly better
than working with their internal research laboratory. AMNL had a
manufacturing capability and was producing components in limited
quantity for government use. This resembled a true manufacturing
environment unlike the YNIWMI research laboratories. YNIWMI did have
some difficulty with the process specifications because the technology
was not yet fully developed. YNIWMI also modified the technology to
meet their manufacturing equipment. YNIWMI did purchase some
equipment for test and evaluation that matched AMNL.
AMNL used the capabilities at YNIWMI and SCC to enhance the
process. Both YNIWMI and SCC found the documentation insufficient for
easy transfer.
TAS, having no experience in this technology, decided that the
most efficient means of transferring the technology would be to
purchase identical equipment to AMNL. This was done in recognizing
that this equipment would probably have little value when TAS took the
next step to the higher performance.
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TAS followed YNIWMI and SCC in the technology transfer by two
years. In doing so TAS was able to benefit from the improved
documentation that had been developed for both SCC and YNIWMI. TAS
had difficulty in initiating the transfer but has had very little
difficulty with documentation and communication. The primary
difficulty for TAS was establishing a need for the classified
technology. TAS paid AMNL for the transfer, something neither YNIWMI
nor SCC had done. YNIWMI and SCC provided technical assistance
contracts but did not pay for the technology. This created additional
difficulties in initiating the transfer.
Each of the companies studied feel very positive about the
technology transfer process. They all feel that they received what
they were looking for and would do additional transfers if a need
occurred.
An additional benefit that each of the corporations had seen was
increased credibility. As a result, contract opportunities at the
national laboratories, other government agencies, and industry are
being offered to the companies. LPC, which has developed a materials
capability, is obtaining research contracts as a result of the
reputation they have gained. TAS is the prime contractor on a large
manufacturing technology contract with the US Air Force as a result of
the AMNL technology transfer. Therefore, in addition to the direct
benefit of the technology transfer, there are many side benefits that
can result from these associations.
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CHAPTER VII
OBSERVATION OF INFLUENCING FACTORS
An objective of this thesis was to make an assessment of the
influencing factors in a technology transfer. Case studies were
conducted to assess the validity of these influencing factors and to
determine which had the most significant impacts on technology
transfer. There were four areas in which attempts were made to
determine the critical factors. These areas were:
1. company strategy,
2. communication network,
3. organizational structure/culture,
4. changes in the national laboratory environment.
The influencing factors based on strategy tended to vary from
company to company. It did not appear that any one strategy was more
successful than another. It is interesting to note that SCC was the
only case where the technology transfer has been completed and a
product made available. SCC's strategy was different than any of the
other companies. Their interest was to fill a gap in their product
line with technology that they could have developed in-house but found
less expensive to develop through a technology transfer. In each of
the other cases the tendency is to use the technology transfer as a
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stepping stone to creating greater capability rather than providing a
specific product.
A question has to be raised here, What defines a successful
technology transfer? All the companies studied indicated that they
successfully obtained what they desired from the transfer process.
But on a score card of successful technology transfers by the national
laboratories, some would argue that only SCC would be considered
successful. This is an area that needs further study and definition.
Each of the companies were looking for a long range payoff from
the technology transfer. In the cases of TAS, YNIWMI, and LPC the
look was as far as 15 years into the future, using the technology
transfer as a stepping stone to improve products and capabilities. In
addition to looking at the long-range payoff, each company was looking
to satisfy particular technology needs. TAS wanted to develop a
capability in molecular composites. YNIWMI was looking for a method
to improve the performance of their technology. SCC needed a
particular product to fill a hole in their product line. LPC was
looking for a way they could improve a mature product by bringing in
new technology. And LEMP, seeing a need to change business direction,
was looking for technologies that would provide for future growth.
These companies were out looking for technologies to fill a need.
They obtained the technology from the national laboratories because it
offered a viable alternative to either internal development or
purchase from another commercial source. In most cases, the company
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was looking at external sources other than the national laboratories
or at developing the technology in-house. Usually for cost and
schedule reasons they elected to go with the technology generated in
the national laboratories.
Credibility of the technology played a role. For SCC, the 80-85
molecular composite combined with the AMNL radiation hardened process
gave them credibility as a component supplier. Had they developed
their own internal source it would have been much more difficult to
sell. A similar case can be made for both YNIWMI and TAS.
Both TAS and LPC received benefits from being a follower in a
technology transfer. TAS followed SCC and YNIWMI in obtaining the 3
micron technology. AMNL's transfer to YNIWMI and SCC provided a
learning experience which enabled AMNL to better understand the
requirements involved in transferring technology to the industrial
sector. As a result the documentation, specifications, and general
communications improved. A similar situation occurred with LPC in
that they followed LEMP's example in obtaining patent protection
agreements. Both TAS and LPC have had fewer difficulties with
communications as a result of lessons learned by the national
laboratories from previous technology transfers.
Communication networks are the most critical factors to successful
technology transfer. It was important in each of the cases that
credibility and trust be developed between the industrial partner and
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the national laboratory. In the case of SCC this trust had been long
established. This was a result of SCC's being a contractor to AMNL.
Long-standing personal relationships were found to be extremely
beneficial during the technology transfer. LEMP used the expertise of
Dr. Smith and his relationships with the national laboratories as a
focal point for their technology transfer.
TAS, not having credibility or working relationships with AMNL,
hired external resources from other companies. TAS got people from
SCC and YNIWMI as well as other companies. These people brought with
them the credibility, trust and working relationships with AMNL.
LPC hired people from other national laboratories with ties to
AESNL. The transfer occurred after LPC hired a manager from the
FWNL. Once he began the technology transfer he hired other
individuals from other national laboratories. He and the people he
hired had credibility and long-standing working relationships with the
people at AESNL.
YNIWMI was the only anomaly. YNIWMI and AMNL were familiar with
each other through third-party contractual arrangements but they had
not worked together before. YNIWMI did not go outside the company to
bring in new people to assist in the technology transfer. YNIWMI
emphasized that they should have placed at least one individual at
AMNL on a full time basis to assist in the technology transfer, an
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AMNL suggestion. This indicated that YNIWMI felt they could have
benefited from higher credibility, more trust, and increased
communications with AMNL.
As most of the companies developed a good understanding of the
technology, they made modifications, and provided them back to the
laboratories, thus improving the technology. SCC and YNIWMI were
heavily involved in modifying the 3-micron process. This resulted in
a give-and-take arrangement between the national laboratory and the
industrial partner. The bottom line is that both sides ended up
benefiting from the technology transfer and a stronger trust was
developed between the two organizations.
YNIWMI commented that one of the strongest deciding factors from
their point of view was AMNL's experience in transferring technology
out of the laboratory into a production environment. Having had
difficulties transferring technologies out of their research
laboratories, they recognized that the research people at AMNL, having
been through that process, better understood the requirements on the
production side. This is an area that YNIWMI feels they benefited
from and would encourage in future technology transfers that similar
relationships be understood.
Organizational structure appeared to have little influence on the
technology transfer except in the case of YNIWMI and LEMP. At these
companies, changes in organizational structure occurred during the
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transfer and resulted in their dropping the technology. In both cases
the strong argument can be made that the changes in organizational
structure resulted from changes in corporate strategy.
SCC was the only organization that had all five of the key roles
of the innovation process filled. These roles, as defined by Allen
and Roberts, were the initiating scientists, the entrepreneur, the
program manager, the sponsor, and the gatekeeper. This may have been
the reason that SCC was the only company who was successful in
bringing the technology to production. In the case of YNIWMI, they
had a strong sponsor which encouraged obtaining the technology. When
this sponsor left there was no entrepreneur there to carry the banner
and find a new sponsor. As a result, the transfer ended. TAS, LPC,
and LEMP, with minimal experience in the technology area, did not have
sufficient people to fill all the roles. As time has progressed, TAS
has begun filling these roles and it is too early to tell the impact
that these will have on the success of the transfer.
Probably a more important factor than organizational structure is
the emphasis placed on the transfer process throughout the
organization. TAS reorganized a functional group to resemble a
project group in order to conduct the technology transfer. Although
the technology was controlled by the functional managers it was
recognized that it was a major undertaking. It was felt that this
could best be handled through a project-oriented organization and this
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was created internal to the engineering organization, the Molecular
Composite Technology Project.
LPC recognized a need to raise the emphasis of materials in the
development of new transmissions and created a new research group.
This resulted in additional focus on materials for the corporation
even though those working in the materials group do not feel that the
corporation has really come around to taking full advantage of this
new capability. They would like to see more commitment by the
corporation.
Finally, external involvement of the government encouraging the
national laboratories to take technology transfer more seriously has
had an influence. LEMP and LPC both feel very strongly that this has
been a positive influence. The experience of TAS as a follower of SCC
and YNIWMI would indicate that there is indeed a benefit from
increased focus and understanding of the technology transfer process.
The key factors seem to be a recognition of a long-term payoff and
internal commitment to the necessity of the technology transfer and
the development of good communication networks which include the
development of credibility and trust between the two organizations.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has attempted to identify the key factors involved in
a technology transfer between a corporation and the national
laboratories. Most of the previous studies looked at technology
transfer from the viewpoint of the national laboratory. Here, by
means of the case studies, an effort has been made to illustrate what
is important from the standpoint of the industry participant.
There were three objectives in this thesis. One, to provide an
understanding of the key elements involved in a technology transfer.
Two, to provide a framework for industry representatives interested in
technology transfer with the national laboratories to improve and
enhance the transfer process. And three, to provide national
laboratories with a better understanding of the transfer processes
involved in technology transfer as viewed from the industry
participant.
Three hypotheses were set forth.
A. Certain elements of the environment for technological
innovation (company culture, structure, and strategic
objectives) play a key role in the transfer of technology
from the national laboratory to private industry.
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B. Face-to-face contact is probably the most significant element
of technology transfer. There must be a strong technological
network and trust between the sending and receiving
organizations.
C. The most successful transfers have occurred as a result of an
industry demand pull and not national laboratory technology
push.
Evidence indicates support for the conclusions that elements of
the innovation process, face-to-face contact, and a strategic need by
a corporation have strong influences over the success of the
technology transfer. It is not clear whether sufficient data have
been gathered in the five case studies to conclusively support or deny
any of the above hypotheses.
An additional factor which was not considered was the impact of
cost and schedule in obtaining technology from the national laboratory
instead of from either internal R&D sources or purchase from another
company.
The companies studied in this case have all recognized a side
benefit associated with the technology transfer. In all five cases
the company involved has received contracts from the originating
national laboratory. These contracts are to pursue improvements on
the existing technology or to develop new technologies that support
corporate R&D activities and the basic mission of the national
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laboratory. Also several companies received contracts from other
government agencies in related technologies.
An intangible side benefit is the credibility that a corporation
received from the transfer of technology with the national
laboratory. The company becomes recognized as a source and a relative
authority in the technology. A third benefit is the knowledge gained
from obtaining the new technology. This knowledge can result in
adaptations to new products and technologies.
In four of the cases the purpose was not to establish a product
but to gain a broad understanding of the generic technology so that
the corporation could advance quickly into new products. Long-range
plans were established which showed the technology transfer from the
national laboratory as a stepping stone to future capabilities. In
four cases a product is currently not available as a result of the
technology transfer. In one case the technology has been modified to
produce the next generation capability. In another case the company
evaluated the technology, brought it in-house, made an assessment of
the future marketplace and decided not to pursue those technologies
further. In the last two cases the transfer is still ongoing and is
providing the necessary stepping stones required to advance each of
the companies capabilities. Both of these companies currently plan to
offer products resulting from the technology transfer. It is too
early to tell whether this will actually happen.
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That brings us to an interesting question. What is it that
defines a successful technology transfer? From the standpoint of the
national laboratories who are scored and measured on the success of
the technology transfer, this could be a critical problem in the
future for technology transfer. If the national laboratories measure
themselves based on licenses, licensing fees, and royalties collected,
they may be sorely overlooking the major benefits that companies
receive from the technology transfer process. This type of measure
could quickly result in a lack of interest in future interchanges with
industry.
All the companies studied in this thesis were extremely favorable
in their comments regarding the capabilities and the knowledge gained
from dealing with the national laboratories. They felt it was
extremely beneficial to the country to have the national laboratories
participating in technology transfer. The only comment that they made
was that it may be beneficial for the laboratories to better
understand the needs, desires, and problems of industry. They
indicated that most of the laboratories are not involved in production
activities and do not fully understand the problems in bringing a
process out of basic research through applied research into
development and finally offering a product for sale. These companies
do not want the national laboratories to lose the focus of their
primary mission in basic research, but they feel closer working
relationships between industry and the national laboratories can only
benefit both parties. The laboratories need to discern how they can
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provide for both sufficient basic research and increased understanding
of industry.
Technology is now becoming a primary element of corporate
strategy. Information and information flow provide the keys to any
successful strategy. In working with the national laboratories a
corporation can quickly gain knowledge in many areas. This was the
case with one of the companies studied. By being a first mover and
accepting the technology transfer, they maintained their lead in the
overall field. Other companies saw the technology transfer as a way
of adding value to their existing product lines. One company used the
technology transfer as a device for identifying new business
potential. I don't think, as a result of this thesis, one can say
that one particular strategy is better than another with regards to
technology transfer. The key is the commitment by the corporation to
follow through and to assess the benefits to the corporation in the
future. In all five cases there was no intent to seek near-term
benefits from the transfer. In each case the corporation recognized
that it would be at least five years before they would reap the
benefits.
Communication networks are fundamental to successful technology
transfer. Face-to-face contact between the originating national
laboratory and the receiving industry partner is essential. More
important is the trust that must exist between the two organizations.
In all five cases studied the primary focus in communications was on
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establishing and developing a trust relationship between the
corporation and the national laboratory. Also, the corporations
viewed the technology transfer as a two-way technology interchange in
which they provided capability to the national laboratory during the
transfer. Both parties benefited from the exchange.
In only one case did the company not have a technical relationship
beforehand and did not hire individuals who had relationships with the
national laboratory. In this case a considerable amount of time was
spent in developing a trust. Because the corporation had an extremely
good reputation in related technology it was easy to build this
relationship. This was done primarily through a technological
interchange in which the corporation provided data and technology to
the national laboratory to enhance the capability of the technology.
In two of the cases the companies had long-established technical
relationships with the originating laboratory. In the other two cases
the companies, not having experience or long-standing relationships
with the national laboratory, hired individuals who filled those needs.
It was difficult to ascertain any impact of corporate culture on
the technology transfer process. The only area that did become
prevalent was when a strong technical capability was resident at the
corporation. In these cases there were some difficulties with the NIH
syndrome although in none of the cases did this present insurmountable
problems.
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In looking at the key roles that need to be filled in an
innovation process it was unclear from the cases studied whether there
was a significant impact in not having any of these roles filled.
Only in one case was it evident that all five roles were used. In
that case the technology transfer was completed with a product being
made available. In the cases that have not yet completed the
technology transfer, attempts are being made to fill the five key
roles. In the case where the technology transfer was made and no
products made available it was evident that not all five roles were
filled. One key individual, a sponsor, provided the emphasis on the
technology transfer. When this individual left the transfer was
discontinued. Again, there is insufficient data from these cases to
ascertain the true impact of the five roles. The key seems to be the
emphasis given to the program by the corporation.
There is also no evidence that organizational structure has any
impact on the technology transfer process. Two of the companies
studied had typical matrix organizations, one favoring the project
side and the other favoring the functional side. Two of the companies
appeared more functionally oriented. In the last case the company
received the technology in product groups. In all the cases the
corporation took advantage of the organizational structure to provide
the appropriate emphasis to satisfy the strategic goals. In two of
the corporations the organization structure was changed to facilitate
and provide additional management focus on the technology transfer.
At two companies the organizational structure changed after the
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technology transfer and in both cases resulted in discontinuing the
transfer. Again there is limited data to support any conclusions with
regards to organizational structure and its impacts on the technology
transfer.
The corporations studied indicated that their next technology
transfers will:
1. deal with a national laboratory that has transferred
technology before,
2. have sufficient internal resources to provide a critical mass
of personnel in order to establish efficient technology
transfer,
3. insure a strong technical relationship and trust between the
receiving and the sending organizations,
4. pay more attention to the details of the documentation, and
5. spend more time working with the national laboratories so
that they better understand the specific needs, goals, and
objectives of industry.
The companies involved were extremely positive about their
relationships with the national laboratories and would continue to
attempt technology transfers in the future. They felt the changes
that have occurred at the national laboratories with regard to
technology transfer, as well as the focus being put on to it by the
federal government, would be advantageous and beneficial to the
competitiveness of U.S. industry. In two of the cases the patent
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protection and licensing agreements that are now available made
technology transfer more amenable to the companies. In the other
three cases, the technology being transferred was changing rapidly
enough that patent protection and licensing agreements provided little
to the corporations involved and were not pursued. In the two cases
where patent protection was pursued, the corporation felt that it
would not have gone through the technology transfer without those
agreements being in place. In both of those cases, the companies were
coming from maturing industries with relatively long product life
cycles. The opposite was true of the other three companies.
A summary of the results of the technology transfer case studies
that were looked at are as follows:
1. One corporation transferred the technology and is providing
product to the marketplace.
2. Two corporations are currently involved in the technology
transfer and have not yet completed the process. They are
three to five years away from completion. One of these
companies is taking advantage of the new laws regarding
technology transfer. It will be interesting to see if there
is any impact on a maturing industry with technology from the
national laboratories.
3. One company looking at multiple technologies as windows of
opportunity assessed that a focusing was needed by the
corporation and decided to pursue technologies that were
being developed elsewhere, not at the national laboratories.
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This was not an indication that they thought the technologies
were not important but they did not match the direction the
company had decided to go.
4. The fifth company transferred the technology, made product
available for a short period of time, and then discontinued
offering product. They took the technology and applied
lessons learned to the next generation capability.
It is interesting to note that all five companies presented the
case for technology transfer being successful based on the knowledge
gained by the corporation.
How do the above conclusions support the hypotheses proposed? For
Hypothesis A the key factor is the corporate commitment and intent on
the technology transfer. In those cases where the corporation saw a
definite strategic advantage in going after technology, the transfer
has proceeded well. In one case where the decision to pursue
technology is pending, the technical people feel that this lack of
focus and emphasis is costing the company time and money. Hypothesis
B held true for all five companies in that it was important to
establish a trust and technological communication network between the
sending and the receiving organization. In most cases this network
existed previous to the transfer process and where it didn't the
corporation either established this relationship or hired individuals
for that purpose. Hypothesis C was supported by the fact that all
five corporations felt that they had initiated the technology transfer
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process. They saw a commercial need, established plans to obtain that
technology, looked at multiple sources for the technology, and saw
benefits in cost and scheduling in working with the national
laboratories.
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